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Introduction 
In the last few years, a number of economists, politicians, 
and pundits have argued that in the 1980's the American economy 
became more tightly integrated into the world economy. By a lot 
of measures, this seems to be true. For example, between 1970 
and 1990 America's exports plus imports as a percentage of gross 
national product rose from 12.7% to 24.9%. Similarly, during the 
1980's the stock of inward foreign direct investment, valued on 
a historic cost basis, grew from 3 % to 8.1 % . 
In particular, people often argue that American 
labor-market trends have been increasingly driven by this 
"globalization" of the economy. Two facts commonly pointed to 
are sluggish real-wage growth and rising wage inequality between 
more-skilled and less-skilled workers. Surely, the argument runs, 
international linkages such as trade and foreign direct investment 
must have contributed to these labor-market developments? A lot 
of prima facie evidence is forwarded to support this claim. It 
usually goes something like, "Because increases in trade, FDI, 
and the like have accompanied these wage trends, the former 
must surely have helped cause the latter. " 
This belief in the globalization of the American labor 
market has already played a big role in public policy. For 
example, Ross Perot, who won 19% of the popular vote in the 
1992 presidential election, is adamantly against free trade with 
developing nations and predicts that NAFTA will rapidly push 
American wages down to Mexican levels. Support for this view 
nearly prevented congressional ratification of NAFTA, and it is 
still strong today: the cover of a recent Business Week reads 
"America's New Populism: Angry citizens are rebelling against 
big government, stagnant incomes, moral decay, and the global 
economy." But it is an open question whether such trade and 
investment policies are warranted. 
In my dissertation I try to go beyond the prima facie 
evidence of globalization to investigate whether international trade 
and multinational corporations influenced trends in the American 
labor market during two periods: the 1980's and the antebellum 
years. In each of the three chapters, my basic approach is to 
articulate the theory of how trade and multinationals can affect 
labor markets, and then apply this theory to the relevant data. My 
main fmding is that in both the 1980's and the antebellum years, 
the strong prima facie evidence pointing to a role for either trade 
or multinationals in labor-market developments was not supported 
by more rigorous empirical analysis. In the 1980's international 
trade and multinational corporations contributed very little, if 
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anything, to either sluggish real-wage growth or rising wage 
inequality. Similarly, in the antebellum years strong integration 
of commodity markets between the Northeast and the Midwest did 
not lead to wage convergence between these regions. The overall 
policy implication is that current policy proposals designed to 
ameliorate the labor-market effects of the globalization of the 
American economy are very likely unwarranted. Policies aiming 
to increase real wages and reduce wage inequality should not 
involve trade and FDI. 
The first chapter, "International Trade and American 
Wages in the 1980's: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup?" 
was co-authored with Robert Lawrence and was published in 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics 1993. 
Two facts about the American labor market in the 1980's 
motivate this paper. First, average real wages barely grew. 
Second, the wages of less-skilled Americans fell relative to those 
of their more-skilled counterparts. The paper investigates the 
contribution of international trade to these two developments. We 
first present the standard trade theory on factor returns, and then 
apply this theory to the data. Our main finding is that trade 
through the standard channels seems to have contributed nothing 
to either of these developments: import prices did not rise 
sufficiently to restrain real wages, and the terms of trade through 
the Stolper-Samuelson process did not diverge relative wages. 
39 
Instead, trends in the domestic side of the economy seem to have 
dominated the wage structure. Sluggish labor-productivity growth 
in the service sector accounts for most of the sluggish real-wage 
growth, and skill-biased technological change appears to account 
for most of the unequal wage growth. 
The second chapter, "International Trade, Multinational 
Corporations, and American Wage Divergence in the 1980's," 
focuses more closely on the wage-divergence issue addressed in 
the first chapter. The literature on this wage divergence has 
demonstrated that a shift in relative labor demand away from the 
unskilled and toward the skilled was its main cause. However, the 
literature has not adequately addressed the hypothesis that the 
"globalization" of the American economy helped cause the 
demand shift. This paper evaluates whether international trade or 
multinational outsourcing contributed to the demand shift and 
resulting wage divergence. First, the paper articulates the theory 
of how trade or multinationals can shift relative labor demand. On 
the trade side, it analyzes the theoretical issues more fully than the 
first chapter did. The paper then analyzes the relevant data in 
light of this theory. My main fmding is that neither international 
trade through the Stolper-Samuelson process nor outsourcing by 
multinationals contributed significantly to America's wage 
divergence in the 1980's. 
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The third chapter, "The Antebellum Transportation 
Revolution and Factor-Price Equalization," applies the techniques 
developed in the first two chapters to the antebellum labor 
market. In antebellum America an extensive network of canals 
and railroads was constructed which slashed transportation costs 
between the Northeast and the Midwest. This "transportation 
revolution" provides a nearly ideal case study of the factor-price 
equalization (FPE) theorem. The paper documents that the lower 
transportation costs helped equalize commodity prices across 
regions. It then presents wage series which surprisingly display no 
evidence of wage equalization across regions. The interesting 
question then becomes why FPE didn't arise. The paper argues 
that regional specialization of production in the Midwest 
prevented it. To support this argument the paper presents 
historical evidence that the Midwest was effectively specialized. 
It then presents a simple model that shows how the nature of 
regional shifts in factor demands depends on whether the region 
specializes ill production. Thus, the transportation revolution was 
realizing one of FPE's usual assumptions---zero trade barriers. 
But the fact that a second assumption--no regional specialization 
of production--was not being realized prevented the first from 
equalizing factor prices. 
Thus, the overall rmding of my dissertation is that in two 
labor-market episodes where strong prima facie evidence pointed 
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to a role for either trade or multinationals, this evidence was not 
supported by more rigorous empirical analysis. In light of this, 
policy aiming to restrict trade or FDI because of their believed 
labor-market effects seems unwarranted. 
Chapter 1 International Trade and American Wages in the 
1980's: Giant Sucking Sound or Small Hiccup? 
The American dream is that each generation should live 
better than its predecessor. Over the century prior to 1973, real 
average hourly earnings rose by 1.9 percent per year. At that rate 
earnings doubled every thirty-six years, and the dream was 
realized. 
The dream no longer holds. Since 1973, the United States 
has failed to match its historic track record. In 1973, real hourly 
earnings, measured in 1982 dollars by the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) , were $8.55. By 1992 they had actually declined to 
$7.43--a level that had been achieved in the late 1960's. Or 
consider real hourly compensation (a more comprehensive 
measure of the payments to labor): between 1973 and 1991, real 
hourly compensation rose by only 5 % . 
A second ominous development in the American economy 
has accompanied this slump: a dramatic increase in the earnings 
of skilled workers relative to those of their less-skilled 
counterparts. Several economists have documented this fall in 
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terms of education, experience, and job classification. For 
example, Davis (1992) calculates this divergence in terms of work 
experience and finds that between 1979 and 1987, the ratio of 
weekly earnings of males in their forties to weekly earnings of 
males in their twenties rose by 25 %. Similarly, we calculate this 
divergence based on job classification and find that in 
manufacturing between 1979 and 1989, the ratio of average 
annual wages of non-production workers to average annual wages 
of production workers rose by nearly 10 % . 
These two developments--sluggish and unequal real-wage 
growth--have coincided with major changes in Ari.J.erica' s 
international economic relations. The coincidence of America's 
accelerated integration into the world economy with its slow and 
uneven wage growth makes it scarcely surprising that the former 
has frequently been advanced as a primary cause of the latter. In 
this paper, we try to advance the debate by a data analysis which 
uses insights from theory to investigate the role of international 
trade on America's recent wage performance. 
In the first section of the paper, we look at the sluggish 
growth of average real wages. In a large group of standard 
labor-market models, as a first approximation we expect the 
performance of average real wages to mirror the performance of 
output per worker. At first glance, however, there appears to be 
a gap between the two. From 1979 to 1991, output per worker 
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grew by 10.5 % but real compensation (average hourly 
compensation deflated by the CPI-U, the Consumer Price Index 
for Urban consumers) grew by only 1.5 %. One possible 
explanation for this gap is that foreigners may have been 
"appropriating" some of this output gain through rising import 
prices. Our analysis indicates, however, that this explanation can 
be rejected in favor of a more straightforward one which involves 
the basket of goods used to deflate things. First, we point out that 
the CPI-U is a basket of consumption goods, but the output per 
worker is deflated by the price of a basket of producer goods. If 
we deflate nominal compensation by the output deflator used in 
the business-output measures of productivity, we find that 
between 1979 and 1991 real product compensation actually 
increased by 9.5%--basically the same as the increase in output 
per worker. Thus, deflating wages with the appropriate prices 
eliminates the output-wage gap. Second, we analyze whether 
rising prices for imports (which are consumed in the U.S. but not 
consumed here) caused the faster growth in consumption prices. 
We fmd that they did not: real consumption compensation growth 
lagged behind real product compensation because of a rise in the 
relative price of housing (which workers consume but do not 
produce) and a decline in the relative price of investment goods 
(which workers produce but do not consume). Thus, our main 
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finding is that trade had nothing to do with the slow increase in 
average real compensation. 
In the second section of the paper, we consider the rise in 
the relative wages of non-production workers. Standard 
international-trade theory, as laid out by Stolper and Samuelson, 
suggests .that changes in the relative returns of factors will reflect 
changes in the prices of the goods that they produce. International 
trade thus redistributes income by changing the terms of trade. 
Many studies of relative wage performance have ignored this 
process, however. Instead, they focus on trade volumes and trade 
deficits. As Bhagwati (1991) has emphasized, trade deficits are 
not the most suitable measures of the effects of trade because they 
are not necessarily associated with relative wage behavior. We 
focus instead on the behavior of traded-goods prices. All other 
things equal, in the Stolper-Samuelson framework a rising relative 
wage of skilled labor is triggered by an increase in the 
international price of skilled-labor intensive products relative to 
those of unskilled- labor-intensive products. When we look at 
America's terms of trade over the 1980's, however, we do not 
find this. In fact, the relative price of non-production-
labor-intensive products fell slightly, indicating that the 
Stolper-Samuelson process actually nudged relative wages 
towards greater equality. From this evidence, we conclude that 
relative wages were not driven by the Stolper-Samuelson process. 
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We do, however, find a positive association between 
total-factor productivity growth and the intensive use of 
non-production labor. This points to technological change as the 
major source of relative wage changes: under the assumption of 
given prices, Hicks-neutral technological change occurring more 
rapidly in the non-production-Iabor-intensive industries should 
increase the relative wage of non-production labor. Indeed, we 
argue that the pervasive decline in the ratio of production to 
non-production workers actually employed--despite the decline in 
the relative wages of production workers--points to a large role 
for technological change which has augmented employment of 
non-production workers. This accords well with anecdotal 
evidence of the shift toward computer-controlled flexible 
manufacturing systems and with recent work by Berman, Bound, 
and Griliches (1992) (who find strong correlations between skill 
upgrading within industries and with increased spending by firms 
on computers and R&D), Krueger (1991) (who estimates that 
from one- to two-thirds of the 1984-89 increase in the premium 
on education was related to the use of computers), and Bartel and 
Lichtenberg (1991) (who find that industries which use young 
technologies pay a premium wage). 
In conclusion, we fmd that international trade contributed 
basically nothing to America's average and relative wage 
performance in the 1980's. Instead, developments on the domestic 
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side of the economy--sluggish productivity growth in the service 
sector and skill-biased technological change--seem to have 
mattered the most. 
Chapter 2 International Trade, Multinational Corporations, 
and American Wage Divergence in the 1980's 
In this chapter I revisit the fact that the wages of 
less-skilled Americans fell sharply in the 1980's relative to those 
of their more-skilled counterparts. First, I extend the work of the 
first chapter on international trade and relative wages by 
analyzing under what conditions the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 
is empirically relevant. Second, I study the contribution to the 
wage divergence of outsourcing: a variety of foreign direct 
investment which decomposes existing production techniques and 
shifts unskilled-intensive activities to foreign countries. 
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem originally was and 
usually is stated in the classic "2x2x2 II model with two countries, 
two goods, two factors of production, and a host of other 
simplifying assumptions. In this framework the theorem is quite 
strong: a rise in the international price of one good will 
unambiguously raise the real wage of the factor used intensively 
in the production of that good and will unambiguously lower the 
real wage of the other factor. For empirical work, the crucial 
question is how the Stolper-Samuelson theorem generalizes to 
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more realistic frameworks. In the previous chapter, we largely 
assumed that the theorem easily applies to the activity in the 
1980's. Here, I analyze the theorem more rigorously by 
considering two important extensions. First, I introduce higher 
dimensions; then I introduce increasing returns to scale. 
First, introduce more factors and goods. With either more 
than two factors or many factors and goods, the theorem cannot 
make unambiguous predictions about real-wage changes. 
However, the strong Stolper-Samuelson theorem does have a 
higher-dimension generalization which makes predictions about 
relative wages without restrictive assumptions. Ethier (1984) 
states it as follows: "there is a tendency for changes in relative 
commodity prices to be accompanied by increases in the rewards 
of factors employed most intensively by those goods whose prices 
have relatively risen the most and employed least intensively by 
those goods whose relative prices have fallen the most." This 
generalization follows directly from cost minimization, and 
therefore requires no restrictions on technology or dimensionality. 
Moreover, just like the strong Stolper-Samuelson, this 
generalization involves shifting demands for factors of production 
across industries and shifting relative employment within 
industries. 
The second extension allows one or more of the industries 
to produce under increasing returns to scale. Helpman and 
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Krugman (1985) point out that this introduces a second channel 
through which trade can affect the utility of factors. Notice the 
use of "utility of factors" rather than factor prices: in a broad 
class of models summarized in Helpman and Krugman, this 
second channel does not operate on factor prices per se but rather 
on the utHity of the owners these factors through an increase in 
available product variety. Distinct from this variety effect, 
Stolper-Samuelson still moves factor prices in these models (one 
of which I analyze more completely). 
Thus, generalizing the 2x2x2 framework to allow higher 
dimensions and increasing returns to scale changes the 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem only slightly. Instead of predictions 
about real-wage movements, it now makes predictions about 
relative-wage movements. The generalized theorem says that a 
rise in the price of a group of products tends to raise the wage of 
the factors used relatively intensively in these products relative to 
the wages of the factors used relatively unintensively in these 
products. Insofar as the concern is explaining shifts in relative 
wages in the U.S. in the 1980's, this theorem is a very relevant 
one for studying the effects of international trade on relative 
wages. 
The second half of this chapter analyzes the role of 
multinational outsourcing. There is a good deal of anecdotal 
evidence that outsourcing was widespread during the 1980's. Its 
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effects, however, are less clear. Some think it harms the V.S. 
economy (for example, a 1986 Business Week special report 
warned that outsourcing is creating "hollow corporations" in 
America), in particular by forcing American labor to compete 
more directly against foreign labor. 
To study the relevance of outsourcing, I first develop a 
model of multinational outsourcing which follows Helpman 
(1984). The key result of this and similar models is that when 
fIrms face international factor-price differentials, they will spread 
facilities across countries (Le., they will employ factors in more 
than one country, and by defInition become multinational). This 
changes within-industry relative factor demands in these 
countries, which in turn changes each country's overall relative 
demand and overall relative wages. Thus, outsourcing actually 
expands the factor-price equalization set that was attainable under 
trade alone. After solving and describing the analytic solution to 
this general model of outsourcing, I then run numerical 
simulations of it to show how it generates within-industry relative 
wage and employment shifts like those observed in the V.S. 
Second, I then test predictions of this model using data 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis on the activity of all V. S. 
multinationals--both domestic parents and foreign 
subsidiaries--from 1977 through 1989. My primary finding is that 
these data are inconsistent with V. S. multinationals having 
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outsourced more heavily in the 1980's. I generate a set of stylized 
facts and find that many are inconsistent with increased 
outsourcing. For example, outsourcing should raise 
production-worker employment in American subsidiaries, or at 
least lower the ratio of non-production to production employment. 
The data do not display either of these trends. Instead, the 
majority of countries and industries had falling levels of 
production employment and rising ratios of non-production to 
production employment. Indeed, these two facts mirror the trends 
seen in America. The similarity between employment trends in 
subsidiaries and in America is consistent with the same force(s) 
operating worldwide--for example, skill-biased technological 
change. This is not to say that outsourcing did not happen at all. 
A few industries such as computers and office products (SIC 
#357) do seem to have outsourced heavily. But these are the 
exception rather than the rule. In addition to these stylized facts, 
I estimate the pattern of factor demands for multinationals by 
fitting a trans log cost function to their production patterns to 
determine their cross elasticity of demand between home and 
foreign unskilled labor. Contrary to the outsourcing model, I find 
that home and foreign unskilled labor at best are weak price 
substitutes and very likely are price complements. 
In conclusion, I find that neither international trade 
through the Stolper-Samuelson process nor outsourcing by 
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multinational corporations contributed significantly to America's 
labor-demand shift and resulting relative-wage divergence. 
Chapter 3 The Antebellum Transportation Revolution and 
Factor-Price Equalization 
The first two chapters of my dissertation found little 
evidence of the international economy's effect on American factor 
markets in the 1980's. In the third chapter I apply the same basic 
methods to another episode, antebellum America. In antebellum 
America an extensive network of canals and railroads was 
constructed which slashed transportation costs between the 
Northeast and the Midwest. This "transportation revolution" 
presents an excellent case study of the factor-price equalization 
(FPE) theorem, which says that under certain conditions when 
trade equalizes commodity prices across regions it also equalizes 
factor prices as well. This is a good case for at least three 
reasons. It represents a clear shock to an existing trading regime 
(where the "countries" are regions in the United States); it avoids 
the difficult question of what exchange rates to use to convert 
prices into a common currency; and it uses new regional 
factor-price data recently assembled by Margo and Villaflor 
(1987) and Goldin and Margo (1992) from records of United 
States Army posts. 
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International-trade economists have historically had a 
rather schizophrenic attitude toward the FPE theorem. In 
theoretical work the FPE theorem has been studied for decades, 
and it has been shown to be a robust idea which holds in a wide 
variety of models. In empirical work, however, the FPE theorem 
has. been largely ignored. One possible explanation of this 
schizophrenia is that people have thought about FPE only as an 
eqUilibrium outcome in isolation from the assumptions which 
generate it. From this perspective, the appropriate empirical test 
for FPE is simply whether factor prices are equal across regions. 
On this criterion FPE is a spectacular failure. If this explanation 
is correct, then I argue that people have been evaluating FPE too 
strictly. One should consider not only FPE but also its motivating 
assumptions, because in most models it requires stringent 
assumptions which almost certainly do not all hold in reality. 
Thinking about FPE as not only an equilibrium outcome but also 
as a set of stringent assumptions motivates an alternative empirical 
approach to FPE. One can look for a tendency towards FPE that 
is motivated by a tendency towards realizing its stringent 
assumptions. The focus thus switches from factor prices alone at 
one point in time to the interaction between trends over time in 
the assumptions needed to equalize factor prices and trends over 
time in the prices themselves. This is the approach I adopt in this 
chapter. 
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To look for FPE, first I document how canals and 
railroads cut transportation costs and thereby helped equalize 
commodity prices across regions. My transportation-cost data are 
largely anecdotal, but they indicate drastic drops on the order of 
25 % to 95 %. The commodity-price data I assemble from raw data 
collected by Cole (1938). Price ratios which measure prices 
between the Northeast and the Midwest for several narrowly 
defined commodities converge strongly towards one between 
1820 and 1860. This convergence is a necessary precondition for 
factor prices in turn to equalize. Next, I analyze regional wage 
series to see whether factor prices were also converging. 
Surprisingly, they were not. Wage ratios which measure wages 
between the Northeast and the Midwest for three types of labor 
(artisans, clerks, and laborers) show basically no first-order or 
second-order convergence between 1820 and 1860. Thus, the data 
reveal a puzzle. The transportation revolution equalized regional 
commodity prices but not regional factor prices. 
Finally, I propose a simple explanation for this puzzle: 
regional specialization of production in the Midwest. To support 
this explanation I present production data from U. S. censuses. 
The data show that even in 1850 and 1860, the Midwest 
effectively produced only agricultural products whereas the 
Northeast produced both agricultural and manufactured products. 
I then present both analytically and diagramatically a simple 
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model in which the nature of regional factor demands depends on 
whether the region specializes in production. The key result is 
that specialization breaks the link between converging product 
prices and converging factor prices. Because of specialization, 
commodity-price equalization does not induce the standard shifts 
in regional factor demands needed to equalize factor prices as 
well. So even though trade barriers were falling, regional 
specialization of production could have prevented these falling 
barriers from equalizing factor prices. After presenting the model, 
I also discuss how regional specialization of production can 
explain several other stylized facts such as regional divergence of 
interest rates. 
In conclusion, I find that canals and railroads generated 
strong commodity-price equalization across regions but that this 
equalization did not lead to FPE--arguably because the Midwest 
was specialized in agriculture production. This finding is a good 
empirical example of the theoretical result that the FPE theorem 
is strictly a static-equilibrium condition which requires several 
preconditions. It is not a comparative-static proposition with 
unambiguous out-of-equilibrium predictions. 
55 
Conclusion 
The overall finding of my dissertation is that in episodes 
where strong prima facie evidence pointed to a role for either 
trade or multinationals in the level and distribution of wages in the 
U.S. labor market, this evidence was not supported by more 
rigorous empirical analysis. 
In light of this, U.S. policy aiming to restrict trade or FDI 
because of their believed labor-market effects seems unwarranted 
at this time. Two points are of relevance here. First, making this 
point may be difficult given the presumption on the part of many 
in the policy debate--such as Ross Perot--that globalization is 
harming the U.S. labor market in some way. But second and 
more importantly, even if trade and FDI were influencing wage 
patterns, restrictions on them would not be the least distortionary 
policy response. Income subsidies or tax breaks for those 
adversely affected would distort fewer margins in the economy 
and thus cause a smaller overall efficiency loss. 
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